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RENDITION OF FINAI..]UDGMENTS BY TRIAL COURTS ON MOTIONS 
FOR jUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 
AND ON MOTIONS FOR A NEW TRIAL 
An interesting and important procedural question was decided. 
by the Court of Appeals of Ohio in the case of Lehman v. flarvey. 1 
The defendant moved for a directed verdict at the .end of the 
plaintiff's evidence, and again at the conch.ision of the entire· 
case. These motions were overruled by the trial court and the 
jury brought in a verdict for the plaintiff. The defendant, tlll.'rc~ 
upon, filed two motions: (1) for judgment notwithst::uuling the 
verdict, (2) for a new trial.. The trial court found there was no 
evidence to support a material averment of the pdition and 
granted the motion for judgment notwithstanding tlw vcrdid. 
The court of appeals, affirming the judgment of the lowl~r court, 
-------~-------'-----------------·--
145 Ohio App. 21.5, 187 N. E. 2H (I<JJJ). 
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held: (I) The court, on a motion for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict, is confined to a consideration of statements in the 
pleadings. 2 Since the petition stated a cause of action, the motion 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should have been 
overruled. (2) The trial court, however, upon the motion by the 
defendant for a new trial, had power to enter final judgment for 
the defendant. On error to the Supreme Court of Ohio the petition 
in error was dismissed for the reason that no debatable con:?titu-
tiom11 question was involved.3 
Formerly at common law a judgment non obstante veredicto 
could be granted onlr in favor of the plaintiff. The remedy of 
defendant was .to have the judgmentarrested. Gradually, how-
ever, this rule was relaxed, either by judicial decision or by statute, 
and it became established that either party might make use of 
this motion} _-\ few courts still adhere to the rule that the motion 
is available .only to an unsuccessful plaintiff to attack a verdict 
as being inconsistent with the defendant's pleaded admissions. 5 
At common law a party, to avail himself of a motion non obstante 
veredicto, had to present his motion before judgment was entered 
on the verdict. Even under statutory modifications broadening 
the common law rules regulating the motion, it is uniformly held, 
unless the time for making the motion is specifically covered by 
statute, that it must be made before judgment is entered and 
failure to do so within such time is fatal. 6 Where a North Dakota 
statute provided for alternative motions for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict and for a new trial, available either before or 
after judgment, it was held that a motion for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict made separately without a motion for a new 
trial had to be made before judgment.l . It was well settled at 
common law that the court in disposing of the motion could not 
20Hw Gs&. ConE § 11601. 
3Lehman v. Harvey, 127 Ohio St. 159, 187 N. E. 201 (1933). 
4Kirk v. Salt Lake City, 32 Utah 143, 89 Pac. 458 (1907); Olson v. Ottertail 
Power Co. et at., 256 N. W. 246 (N. D. 1934). 
5King v. Kaw-Mo Wholesale Grocer Co., I 88 Mo. App. 235, I 75 S. W. 77 
(1915); First Nat. Bank of Ziegler, Ill. v. Dunbar, 72 S. W. (2d) 821 (Mo., 
1934); David v. Gilbert et al., 85 Colo. 184, 274 Pac. ll21 (1929). 
· 
60lson v. Ottertail Power Co. et al., supra note 4. 
7Supra note 6. 
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go back of the pleadings and consider the sufficiency of the 
evidence. 8 
The modern development of the motion for judgment non 
obstante veredicto centers about the case of Slocum v. New York 
Life Insurance Company decided by the Supreme Court of the 
United States in 1913. 9 Here the trial court, when all the evidence 
was in, refused to direct a verdict for the defendant and the jury 
returned a general verdict for the plaintiff. The circuit court of 
appeals found as a matter of law that a verdict ought to have 
been directed for the defendant, and entered judgment for the 
defendant under a Pennsylvania statute permitting final judg-
ment to be granted under such circumstances. On appeal all of 
the justices of the Supreme Court . agreed that the trial court 
should have directed a verdict for the defendant, but the majority 
held that the circuit court of appeals had no power to direct a 
final judgment for the defendant in conformity with· the Penn-. 
sylvania statute, since such procedure contravened the Seventh 
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States which 
declares that, "No fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-
examined, in any court of the United States, than according to 
the rules of the common law." 
· Persons interested in procedural reform were surprised at this 
holding andsought to .aid in bringing about a rehearing of the 
case, but a rehearing was refused.10 The decision was referred to 
·as a "public misfortune,'' 11 and as ·preserving the right to two 
trials by jury.12 . in a case decided the same year the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts rdused to follow the rule of tl1e 
Slocum case.13 This it· could ·do since the Seventh Amendment 
8Slocum . v .- New York Life Insurance U .' S. 364 (·I 'II. I); Note, 
1913 A ANN. CAS. 1019. 
0Supra note 8. . 
10Am: ~ar Ass'n Rep.}913 p. 546, 56L · 
11Thomdike, Trial By Jury in the United States Courts, 26 IIAit v. L. i{Jtv. 
732, 737 (1913). "The decision of the majority of the court is a puhlic mis·. 
"fortune, because it destroys a simple means of enforcing, without t lu· ex Jlt~ust·, 
delay, and uncertainty of a new· trial, a right tq which th" dn·isiuu shows tL 
· party was entitled at the trial." 
12Tbayer, Judicial Administration, 63 U. OF PA .. L. Rnv. 585. 511X (I'll.~). 
13Bothwell v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 215 Mass. 467, 102 N. E. M5 (I'll.\). 
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limits the power of the federal government only. 14 As late as 1931 
there was an attempt by a federal district court to have the 
Supreme Court change its holding in the Slocum case. Th(• court 
granted a motion for judgment non obstante veredicto on the ground 
that it should have directed a verdict and failed to do so. 1 ~ The 
court of appeals, reversing the judgment in the district court, 
stated, "The dissenting opinion in the Slocum case seems to us, 
as it seemed to the trial judge, convincing. But it is a dissenting 
opinion. While laymen may think a decision of the Supreme Court 
which is not unanimous is less authoritative than one that· is, 
courts cannot gi,-e countenance to that misconception, .. \Vhen 
a question has been decided by the Supreme Court, it rs, so. 
far as the inferior federal courts are concerned, a question no 
longer.' ' 16 
In spite of the strong adverse criticism of writers and judges, 
the rule laid down in the Slocum case has become the settled rule 
of the federal courtsY However, the state courts have uniformly 
held that their statutes, with provisions similiar to the Penn-
sylvania statute discussed in the Slocum case, are constitutional, 
and have shown no disposition to follow the lead of that case in 
interpreting the right of trial by jury as guaranteed by their 
constitutions. 1s Even in actions which have arisen under the 
Federal Employers Liability Act in state courts judgments 
notwithstanding the verdict have been entered following the 
"Minn. & St. Louis R. R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 36 Sup. Ct. 595 
(1916). 
16Glynn v. Krippner, 47 F. (2d) 281 (D. C. Minn., 1931). 
IGGJynn v. Krippner, 60 F. (2d) 406, 409 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932). 
17Meyers v. Pittsburgh Coal Co., 233 U. S. 184, 34 Sup. Ct. 559 (1914); 
Fidelity Title Co. v. Dubois Electric Co., 253 U.S. 212, 40 Sup. Ct. 514 (1919); 
Pedersen v. Delaware, etc. R. R. Co., 229 U.S. 146, 33 Sup. Ct. 648 (1914). 
lBWayland v. Lathan, 89 Cal. App. 55, 264 Pac. 766 ( 1928); Commercial 
Ins. Co. v. Scammon, 123 Ill. 601, 14 N. E. 666 (1888); Borg v. Chicago, 
R. I. P. Ry. Co., 462 Ill. 348, 44 N. E. 722 ( 1896); Vandenberg v. Kaat, 252 
Mich. 187, 233 N. W. 220 (1930); Kernan v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 64 Minn. 
312, 67 N. W. 71 (IS96); Williams Yellow Pine Co. v. Henley, ISS Miss. 
893, 125 So. 552 ( tlJJOl; Olson v. Ottertail Power Co. et. al., 256 N. W. 246 
(N. D., 1934); Dalmas Y. Kemble,. 215 Pa. 410, 64 At!. 559 (1906); Gunn v. 
Union R. Co., 27 R. 1. .120, 62 Atl. 118 (1905); Forbes & Co. v. Southern 
Cotton Oil Co., l.hl \"a. !·l.'i, 108 S. E. IS (1921); Campbell v. Weller, 25 Wyo. 
65, 16-l Pac. SSI (1'117\. 
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state procedure19 and appellate courts have enten~d final judg-
ments where the trial court should have directed a verdict. 20 
Where there are no statutory enactments governin~ the •notion, 
it is generally held that the common law rule, that in disposing 
of the motion the court cannot go back of the pleadings and con-
sider the sufficiency of the evidence, is applicable. 21 Several 
states, including Ohio, have codified this rule. 22 A few courts have 
held that the procedural statutes of their states impliedly exclude 
motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. z:t Texas 
courts hold that the motion is foreign to their practice, 24 and that 
a motion· to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial is the 
proper procedure. 25 
Control and guidance by the court are fundamental in our 
system of trial by jury. The judge was never meant to be a 
dictator, nor on the other hand was he meant to be a mere umpire 
in a battle of wits. His function is to insure that justice shall be 
done. This is a very obvious to everyone, yet it is often lost sight 
of in the maze of technicalities surrounding legal procedure.· 
Rules governing motions are not so inflexible that the courts, or 
the legislatures, finding new conditions demanding new procedure, 
cannot vary their procedure so long as the variance does not 
affect fundamental constitutional guarantees. 26 It seems that 
19Marshall v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 133 Minn. 461, 157 N. W. 638 
(1916). . 
soculf S. I. R. Co. v. Hales, 140 Miss. 829, 105 So. 468 (1925). 
21Foster v. Leftwick, 52 Okla. 28,.152 Pac. 583 (1915); St. L. S. F. Ry. Co. 
v. Bell, 134 Okla. 251, 273 Pac. 243 (1928); David v. Gilbert eta/., ~S Colo. 
184, 274 Pac. 821 (1929); Southern Products Co. v. Franklin C(>il Hoop Co., 
183 Ind. 123, 106 N. E. 872 (1914); Kirk v. Salt Lake City, .12 Utah 143, 
89 Pac. 458 ( 1907); Citizens Trust Co. v. Service Motor Car ·c .... 1.'4 Tenn. 
507, 297 S. W. 735 (1927). But see Neil v: Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. of 
New York, 135 Tenn. 28, 1.85 S. W. SOl (1916). 
220HIO GSN. Coos § 11601; Manning v. Orleans, 42 Neh. 71 ~. liO N. W. 
953 ( 1894); Bertin & Lepori v. Mattison et al., 80 Ore. 359, 15 7 Pal'. L~.l ( 1916). 
23Prairie Flour Mill Co. v. Farmer's Elevator Co. et a/., 4.' lduhu 229, 261 
Pac. 673 (1927); Best v. Beaudry, 62 Mont. 485, 205 Pac. 2.W (1~'~.!). 
UHayes v. G. A. Stowers Furniture Co., 180 S. W. 149 (Tex. Civ. :\pp., 1'!15). 
25Hicks et al. v. Armstrong et al., 142 S. W. 1195 (Tex. Civ. A,;· ... (1912). 
26
"The highly artificial rules of procedure at common law whidt prevailed 
in England when the seventh amendment was adopted have lonl( since heen 
abandoned in that country, and in nearly all of the United St~th•s, in favor 
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any proper aid to the judge in carrying out his duties of control 
and guidance is justifiable so long as it does not deprive the 
litigants of their right to have the jury pass on the facts in the 
case. 27 The Pennsylvania statute considered in the Slocum case, 
and the other state statutes of like import, do not seem· to en-
croach upon the province of the jury. 28 It -has been held that a 
statute taking away from the courts the right to direct a verdict 
is unconstitutional since it contravenes the constitution which 
lodges the judicial power of the state in the courts. 29 
Few of the constitutions of the states contain provisions similiar 
to that of the Federal Constitution to the effect that,· "no fact 
tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined, in any court of 
the United States, than according to the rules of the common 
law." Most of the constitutions state merely that, "the right of 
trial by jury shall be inviolate. ''30 It is arguable that the states 
of a simpler and less technical procedure. In our own state, while, we have 
preserved the inviolability of the right of trial by jury, in this regard conform-
ing to the first part of the seventh amendment of the federal constitution, 
we have not irrevocably bound ourselves to the ancient rules of procedure at 
common law by adopting any constitutional provision similar to that con-
tained in the second half of the seventh amendment, upon which the decision 
in the Slocum v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. turned." Peterson v. Ocean Electric 
Ry. Co., 161 App. Div. 728, 146 N.Y. S. 604, 610 (1914). 
2'1"Litigation should never be protracted where this, with due regard to 
the rights of parties, can possibly be avoided. Interest rei publicae ut sit finis 
litium is a maxim so old that its origin is hidden in remote antiquity, and 
the policy which it inculcates is so essential as not to admit of question or 
dispute." Harris v. Hull, Ex'r, 70 Ga. 831, 839 (1883). 
ss"What the judge may do is still the same in substance, but the time when 
he may do it is enlarged so as to. allow deliberate review and consideration 
of the· facts and the law upon the whole evidence. If upon such .consideration 
it shall appear that a binding direction for either party would have been proper 
at the close of the trial, the court may enter judgment later with the same 
effect. But, on the other hand, if it should appear that there was conflict of 
evidence or a material fact, or any reason why there could not have been a 
binding direction, then there can be no judgment against ·the verdict now. 
As already said, there is no intent in the act to disturb the settled line of 
distinction between the provinces of the court and the jury." Delmas v. 
Kemble, 215 Pa. 410, 64 At!. 559, 560 (1906). 
29Thoe v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 181 Wis. 456, 195 N. W. 407 (J'J2J). 
For a discussion of directed verdicts and. demurrers to evidence see Hopkins 
v. Nashville C. & St. L. Ry., 96 Tenn. 409, 34 S. W. 1029 (1896). 
302 THOMPSON, TRIALS (2d ed. 1918) § 2226. 
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meant by their constitutional provisions as to trial by jury just 
what the framers of the United States Constitution meant. It, 
therefore, would seem from this point of view that the state courts 
are dealing, intrinsically, with the same problem when they are 
passing on the constitutionality of their statutes with provisions 
regulating motions non obstante veredicto and the power of the 
appellate courts to enter final judgment where the lower court 
should have directed a verdict. The states, almost without 
exception, take the broad practical view of the dissenting opinion 
in the Slocum case, under a policy well set forth by the court in 
the Forbes & Co. v. Southern Cotton Oil Co. "The object of the 
statute is to put an end to litigation, to obviate repeated trials 
and the delay and expense of litigation, and to remove the tempta-
tion to perjury by patching up the weak places disclosed at a 
former trial, not by after-discovered evidence, but by the same 
witnesses relied upon at the former trial."31 
The second question passed upon by the Court of Appeals of 
Ohio in the case of Lehman v. Harvey32 was whether the trial 
court could render final judgment for the defendant on a motion 
for a new trial, where it should have directed a verdict for the 
defendant and failed to do so .. As has been pointed out, a motion 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was not available, 
since upon such motion the statute of Ohio requires that a court 
shall be confined to a consideration of the pleadings. The court, 
therefore, had to consider whether upon common law principles, 
in the face of the Ohio statute defining a new trial,33 it should 
broaden the effect of a motion for a new trial and make it serve 
as the basis for final judgment without a new trial of the facts 
before another jury. 
Historically, a motion for a new trial was introduced on account 
of the severity of the judgment of attain, and the main ohjl'ct of 
the motion was to correct errors of the jury, not of tlw ('ourt. 
At common law no writ of error lay from the decision on a motion 
3lt30 Va. 245, 108 S. E. 15, 24 (1921). 
32Supra note I. 
33
" A new trial is a re-examination, in the. same .court, of an is~tu· of fad, 
after a verdict by a jury, a report of a referee or master, or a deci~iou hy thl' 
court." Omo GEN. CooE § 11575. The term "new trial" means a n·hc·ariuK 
of the case from the beginning. Dayton & Union R. Co. v. Daytou & Muuci" 
Traction Co., 72 Ohio St. 429, 74 N. E. !95 (1904). 
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for a new trial."' The object of the motion was to have the verdict 
rendered in the case set aside, so that there might be a re-exami-
nation of the issues of fact involved in the case, and the judge 
might again charge the jury as to those issues of fact.35 
There is another line of authority, exemplifying the modern 
trend, which holds that the office of a motion for a new trial is 
not alone to secure another hearing, but to present the errors 
complained of for correction, if possible, without another hearing. 
Under this conception it is permissible, on motion for a new trial, 
for the losing party to question the action of the court in refusing 
him peremptory instructions. The cases holding this view have 
extended the office of the motion for a new trial-unjustifiably 
in the light of the historical ·development of the motion, but 
justifiably in the light of modern day needs. Under the modern 
doctrine the trial court is given an opportunity to correct the 
error made in refusing to direct a verdict, or to give peremptory 
instructions, and to avoid burdening the higher courts with the 
work of correcting errors which the trial court could have cor-
rected.36 
Many courts, consistent with the development of the motion 
for a new trial. have held that final judgment cannot be granted 
on such motion. 37 It has been held that in an equity case where 
there is a motion for a new trial and the court changes its mind, 
"Kearney v. Snodgrass and others, 12 Ore. 311, 7 Pac. 309 (1885); Zaleski 
v. Clark, 45 Conn. 401 (18i7). 
36Warner et al. v. Goding, 91 Fla. 260, 107So. 406 (1926). 
ZOBarnes v. Noel, 1.31 Tenn. 131, 174 S. W. 276 (1915); Memphis St. Ry. 
Co. v. Johnson, IH Tenn. 632, 88 S. W. ·169 (1905); Merriman v. Coca Cola 
Bottling Co. of 1\!cl\!innville, 68 S. W. (2d) .149 (Tenn. 1933); Gammon v. 
Abrams, 53 Wis. 323, 10 N. W. 479 (1881). The Oregon courts concede that 
ordinarily a trial court exceeds its power upon a motion for a ·new trial by 
setting aside a verdict in whole orin part arid entering a final judgment with-
out a new trial, but its action in so doing will not be reversed where on the 
facts, as to which there must be practically no conflict, a verdict should have 
been directed, as a new trial would be an obviously futile thing. Herndobler 
v. Rippen, 75 Ore. 22, 126 Pac. 140 (1915); Hughes v. Holman, 110 Ore. 
415, 223 Pac. 730 (1924). 
TILoy v. McDowell, S.'i Okla. 286, 205 Pac. 1089 (1922); Houston v. R·oach, 
11 Ky. L. Rep. 52 (ISS9);Schdn v. Epstin, llOS. C. 433, 96S. E. 905 (1918); 
Wichita Falls Traction Co. v. Cook, Judge, et al., 122 Texas 446, 60 S. W. 
(2d) 764 {1933); Thomas v. Kansas City Elevated Ry. Co., 76 Kan. 141, 
90 Pac. 816 (1907); Rankin v. Oates, 183 N.C. 517, 112 S. E. 32 (1922). 
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the court can· only grant a new trial and cannot render final 
judgment.38 · Where a jury was waived, it was held that the trial 
court could not of its own motion set aside its general finding 
for one party without granting a new tria1.39 
A Virginia statute provides for final judgment on a motion 
for a new trial. 40 (It will be noted that there is no essential differ-
ence between this statute and those mentioned under motions 
for judgment non obstante veredicto. The same general purpose 
underlies each, andthe same constitutional question is presented.) 
The courts, construing this statute, hold that if no evidence is 
offered, or none that would warrant a jury in finding a verdict 
in accordance therewith, then the rights of the parties become a 
question of law, and there is no controversy to be determined by 
a jury and the constitutional guaranty does not apply.41 Peremp-
tory instructions directing a verdict are forbidden by statute in 
Virginia. It was argued, therefore, that the statute providing for 
final judgment on a motion for a new trial must be invalid. It 
was held that the legislature might well say that at the time of 
the trial the judge, since he had at that time no opportunity to 
weigh and consider, should not give instructions. However, after 
the verdict, the judge, with time to examine authorities and 
deliberately review all the evidence, could determine whether the. 
duty rested on him to set aside the verdict of the jury.42 
It has been held, in line with the reasoning of .the Slocum case, 
that this Virginia statute may not be followed by a federal court 
in view of the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States which require~ a new trial on the vacation of a 
28Hnrley v. Kennally, 186 Mo. 229, 85 S. W. 357 (1904); Hovey v. Grier 
et al., 324 Mo. 634, 23 S. W. {2d) 1058 {1929). 
39Wright &.Anotherv. Hawkins, 36 Ind. 264 (1871). 
40
"When the verdict of a jury in a civil action is set aside by a trial court upon 
the ground that it is contrary to the evidence, or without evidence to support 
it, a llt>W trial shall not be granted· if there is sufficient evidence before the 
court to enable it to decide the case upon its merits, but such final judgment 
shall tw <·nh·rcd as to the court shall seem right and proper .... Nothing in 
this St'l'tion l'ontained shall be construed to give to the trial courts any greater 
powl'r '"'<'r n~rdicts than they now have under existing rules of procedure, 
nor to iinpair the right to move for a new trial on the ground of after dis-
cown·tl "'·itlenc<'." · VA. ConE ( 1924) § 6251. 
"Furlws & C1>. v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 130 Va. 245, 10!! S. E. IS (1921). 
"Fiowt·ts , .. Virginian R. Co., 135 Va. 367, 116 S. E. 672 (1923). 
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verdict.43 A federal court may, however, reserve its ruling on a 
motion to dismiss the complaint on the merits. After the verdict 
is brought in the court may dismiss the complaint, but it must not 
set aside the verdict.44 If the dismissal of the complaint was 
erroneous, judgment could then be entered by the appellate coUrt 
on the reinstated verdict and a new trial avoided. This procedure 
is not in violation of the Seventh Amendment since the court 
expressly refuses to set aside the verdict of the jury. There is no 
re-examination of the facts tried by the jury.46 
The result reached in the case of Lehman v. Harvey is sound. 
However, it seems rather illogical for the court to grant final 
judgment on a motion for a new trial-something the defendant 
has not asked, and something which is inconsistent with the pur-
pose of the motion; Inasmuch as civil procedure in Ohio is regu-
lated by statute, it would appear desirable for the legislature 
either to provide a new form of motion by which a trial court can 
correct, after verdict, its error in failing to direct a verdict at the 
proper time, or to extend the scope of the present statute govern-
ing motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict to permit 
a trial court in passing· on such a motion to consider the suffi-
ciency of the evidence. 
ARTHUR W. PHELPS. 
43Norton v. City Bank & Trust Co., 294 Fed. 839 (C. C. A. 4th, 1923). 
"Clemence v. Hudson & M. Ry Co., 11 F. (2d) 913 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926). 
46Hoffman et al. v. American Mills Co.; 288 Fed. 768 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923). 
